Tentative

Instructor:
Richard Lee (Office hours)
Course number:
PHIL 5983 002 (ISIS number: 14122)
Time:
W 4:00 p.m. - 6:50 p.m.
Room:
MAIN 203
Pre-requisites:
Graduate standing or permission of the instructor
Brief Description:
The Doctrine of Double Effect, which has its roots in Thomistic Ethics, is a purported deontological constraint on the permissibility of action. This principle (according to one formulation) holds that an action is permissible if it is a choice which "is either good or indifferent from which there follows a twofold effect, one good, the other evil, if a proportionate grave reason is present, and if … the agent … does not intend the evil effect." (Gury, quoted in Woodward p.8) After analyzing the notion of intention we'll look at various formulations of the principle, defenses of it, and objections to it. T. M. Scanlon begins his recent book Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, and Blame with a critique of this principle. After studying the basics of Scanlon's contractualist theory of morality (in his earlier writings), we'll scrutinize Scanlon's take on the doctrine of double effect and his subsequent account of moral blame. Finally we will explore applications of the doctrine of double effect, especially in "just war theory."
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Richard Lee, rlee@uark.edu, last modified: 7 April 2010