Sidgwick on Motive and Intention

Sigwick on Motive and Intention

Henry Sidgwick takes up the distinction between motive and intention in The Methods of Ethics (7th edition., Hackett, 1981; first edition: 1874; 7th edition: 1907) III.1.2 pp.202f

"In the first place the distinction between `motive' and `intention' on ordinary language is not very precise: since we apply the term `motive' to foreseen consequences of an act, so far as they are conceived to be objects of desire of the agent, or to the desire of such consequences: and when we speak of the intention of an act we usually, no doubt, have desired consequences in view. I think, however, that for the purposes of exact moral or jural discussion, it is best to include under the term `intention' all the consequences of an act that are foreseen as certain or probable; since it will be admitted that we cannot evade responsibility for any foreseen bad consequences of our acts by the plea that we felt no desire for them, either for their own sake or as means to ulterior ends: such undesired accompaniments of the desired results of our volitions are clearly chosen or willed by us. Hence the intension of an act may be judged to be wrong, while the motive is recognized as good; as when a man commits perjury to save a parent's or a benefactor's life." (III.1.2. p.202)

"an act cannot be right, even when the intention is such as duty would prescribe, if it be done from a bad motive ..." (III.1.2 p.202)

"a man's intention cannot be wholly right, unless it includes the repression, so far as possible, of a motive known to be bad." (III.1.2 p.202)

"While a man can resolve to aim at any end which he conceives as a possible result of his voluntary action, he cannot simultaneously resolve not to aim at any other end which he believes will be promoted by the same action; and if that other end be an object of desire to him, he cannot, while aiming at it, refuse to act from this desire." (III.1.2 p.203)

"A further source of confusion between `intention' and `motive' arises from the different point of view from which either may be judged. Thus an act may be one of a series which the agent purposes to do for the attainment of a certain end: and our moral judgement of it may be very different, according as we judge the intension of the particular act, or the general intention of the series regarded as a whole. Either point of view is legitimate, and both are often required ..." (III.1.2. note p.203)

"So again, in judging a motive to be good or bad, we may either consider it simply in itself, or in connexion with other balancing and controlling motives-either actually present along with it, or absent when they ought to be present ... It is easy to see that one or other of these different distinctions is apt to blend with and confuse the simple distinction between intention and motive." (III.1.2 note p.203)

"On the whole, then, I conclude (1) that while many actions are commonly judged to be made better or worse by the presence or absence of certain motives, our judgments or right and wrong strictly speaking relate to intentions, as distinguished from motives; and (2) that while intentions affecting the agent's own feelings and character are morally prescribed no less than intentions to produce certain external effects, still, the latter form the primary-although not the sole-content of the main prescriptions of duty, as commonly understood ..." (III.1.2 p.204)