Third Examination: Questions

[Be sure you are familiar with the format and ground rules for this exam.]

Questions will be referred to by their "names," listed to their left.

Tentative

"Name"  Question
N-SIDE Robert Nozick (in "Side Constraints") distinguishes side-constraint views from end-state views of ethics. Explain each view and the distinction between them. Explain how a "utilitarianism of rights" would differ from the treatment of rights on a side-constraint view. Which seems a better view of morality? Why?
F-DDE State and carefully explain the principle (or "doctrine") of double effect. Give examples of actions which would be morally acceptable according to it, and also examples of actions which would be morally unacceptable according to that principle. (And explain, of course, how these examples satisfy or violate, respectively, the principle of double effect.)
F-AID Foot claims that "the distinction between direct and oblique intention plays only a quite subsidiary role in determining what we say in these cases, while the distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is very important indeed." Explain. What reasons does she give? Is she right? Critically discuss.
T-EX Consider some example used by Judith Jarvis Thomson in "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem" Explain the example. Say what Philippa Foot's theory (as explained by Thomson) says about the example (whether a certain action would be morally right or wrong and why), what Thomson's theory says (whether a certain action would be morally right or wrong and why, and finally what you say: Is a certain action right or wrong here and why?
D-NMP Dancy argues that there are no moral principles. Explain and critically discuss his argument.
H-INNRWhat does Gilbert Harman (in "Moral Relativism Defended") mean by "inner judgments?" What does he think the "logical form" of such judgments is? What does Harman think is true of all inner judgments? Are all moral judgments inner judgments in Harman's sense? If not, explain why some moral judgments are not. If all are inner judgments, give examples of moral judgments Harman thinks not to be inner judgments and explain how they really are. Critically discuss.
H-PUZZIn "Moral Relativism Defended" Harman writes "I will argue ... that this hypothesis accounts for an otherwise puzzling aspect of our moral views that, as far as I know, there is no other way to account for." What hypothesis is he referring to? What is the "puzzling aspect" that he is referring to? How (according to Harman) does the hypothesis account for this puzzling aspect? Explain. Does his hypothesis account for it? Is there any other way to account for it? Critically discuss.
H-AGREWhat does Gilbert Harman (in "Moral Relativism Defended") mean by an "agreement?" What, according to Harman, do agreements (in this sense) have to do with morality? Explain at least two objections that have been brought against implicit agreement theories and explain how Harman's theory (in his view) avoids these objections. Critically discuss.
GT-STR Explain Gauthier's distinction between a "straightforward" maximizer and a "constrained" maximizer. Is it rational to be a constrained maximizer? Why or why not? Critically discuss.
GT-LEFT Suppose Gauthier's arguments about the rationality of constrained maximization are correct. What follows about the justification of morality? In other words, what kinds of moral behavior find their justification in Gauthier's arguments? What kinds of apparently moral behavior are left without any rational support by Gauthier's argument? Describe the kind of "morality" Gauthier thus finds rationally justifiable. Critically discuss.
R-OPExplain Rawls' "original position" and how this is used to justify principles of justice.
R-2PRRawls offers two principles of justice. State and explain these.
SC-MATScanlon compares several views that might be held about the nature of mathematics with views that might be held about the nature of morality. Explain these views. Which view seems most plausible? Why? Critically discuss.
SC-UTIWhat does Scanlon mean by "Philosophical Utilitarianism?" How does it differ from normative utilitarianism? What is the relation between these views? Does Scanlon accept philosophical utilitarianism? Critically discuss philosophical utilitarianism.
SC-CONExplain in detail Scanlon's example of a contractualist account of the nature of moral wrongness which he states at the begining of part II. Give examples of how this view would determine some action to be wrong. Critically discuss.
SC-MOTScanlon thinks that his account of contractualism provides "an extremely plausible account of moral motivation." What account of moral motivation does contractualism provide in his view? Is this plausible? Critically discuss.
O-JUST Can morality be rationally justified? If so, how? If not, why not? Critically discuss.


Richard Lee, rlee@uark.edu, last modified: 6 December 2011