Short Paper Assignments

(Papers should be e-mailed to rlee@uark.edu by the deadline.)

1. Due Thursday, September 4, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?" Donald Davidson suggests that D, P1, P2, and P3 together appear inconsistent. Explain this (what each says and why they seem inconsistent). Then, briefly, explain how Davidson's solution avoids, according to him, this inconsistency.

2. Due Thursday, September 11, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
John Searle in "The Basic Structure of Intentionality, Action, and Meaning" writes "Intentional states ... have conditions of satisfaction and directions of fit." Explain this, being sure to explain what the terms mean. Give several examples.

3. Due Thursday, September 18, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In "The Logical Structure of Reasons" Searle explains that a "total reason is a set of factive entities." Explain what this means. That will involve explaining what he means by "factive entities," and what he means by a "total reason." And it will involve giving examples. He also distinguishes (in that chapter) between what he calls "internal" and "external" reasons. Explain this (his) distinction. He says "The agent's deliberation can operate only on internal reasons, but the internal reasons are often valid reasons only because they represent external reasons." Explain what he means by that.

4. Due Thursday, September 25, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In "Some Special Features of Practical Reason: Strong Altruism as a Logical Requirement" Searle argues that I am committed "to recognize that when you are in pain I have a reason to help you." Carefully lay out his argument for this claim, being sure to identify its premises. Where, if at all, does the argument go wrong?

5. Due Thursday, October 2, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In "How we Create Desire-Independent Reasons for Action" Searle writes "That imposition of that sort of status function, of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction is already a commitment." Explain this. That will involve explaining "status function," "conditions of satisfaction," "imposition of ... conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction," "commitment," etc.

6. Due Thursday, October 9, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In "Why There is No Deductive Logic of Practical Reason" Searle finds objections to three "Patterns of Practical Reason." Explain what each of these patterns is and why Searle objects to each one.

7. Due Thursday, October 16, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
Michael Bratman in "The Intentions-Based-Reasons View" (2.5) puts up for consideration a revision to the desire-belief model of reasons, which he class "the intentions-based-reasons view." He then criticizes the view because it, he says, "leads us to sanction unacceptable forms of bootstrapping." Explain this intentions-based-reasons view. What does Bratman mean by "bootstrapping?" Explain the example involving Mondale's third question. So, what's this problem with bootstrapping?

8. Due Thursday, October 23, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
Michael Bratman in "Plans and Practical Reasoning" offers a "log" example (pp. 39f). Explain the example. What thesis is the example supposed to support? Explain the thesis. Does the example support the thesis? Critically discuss.

9. Due Thursday, October 30, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
Michael Bratman explores what he calls an "ahistorical" theory of rationality. In section 4.3.2 of Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason Bratman (with appeal to earlier material) puts up this ahistorical theory for consideration. See the last paragraph on page 59 for the overall structure of the ahistorical theory. Details of the principles are provided earlier in the chapter. State this theory and explain it with several examples of intentions that would be rational and (others that would be) irrational on this view. Don't use the Mondale example (or variations thereof).

10. Due Thursday, November 6, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In section 6.1.2 of Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason Michael Bratman offers a "Historical principle of nondeliberative rationality for the basic case. Explain what he means by "the basic case" and give examples that are clearly fit and (others that) don't fit "the basic case." Explain his historical principle. Again, talk through it using examples, an example of case in which it is rational for someone to intend something, and an example of a case in whith it is not rational for an agent to intend to do a certain thing. Bratman considers two kinds of apparent "problems" for this analysis. In each case he responds to a queston "Is this plausible?" with "I think it is." Explain these two problems and Bratman's response.

11. Due Thursday, November 13, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
On page 145 of Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason Michael Bratman writes "It is clear that once we accept this quartet of principles we are faced with the problem of the package deal." Explain this problem. Explain the four principles. Explain how accepting those principles, according to Bratman, results in that problem.

12. Due Thursday, November 20, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In section 2.2 of Practical Reality Jonathan Dancy offers an argument against the DBR thesis. This is not the so-called "Simple Argument," but one, perhaps, based on "the advice point." Explain the DBR thesis and Dancy's (non-simple) argument against it.

13. Due Thursday, December 4, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
In chapter 3 of Practical Reality Jonathan Dancy "two main manoeuvers" that the "objectivist" might use to account for apparently "subjective" reasons. (See e.g. p.56, p.62.) Explain the objectivist view, what the objectivist is trying to account for in these apparently subjective reasons, and (in greater detail, using examples) the two main manoeuvers, especially the second one. This will require you to explain detachment. Critically discuss.

Richard Lee, rlee@uark.edu, last modified: 30 November 2003

1.	Due Thursday, September 4, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In "How is Weakness of the Will Possible?" Donald Davidson suggests that D, P1, P2, and P3 together appear inconsistent. Explain this (what each says and why they seem inconsistent). Then, briefly, explain how Davidson's solution avoids, according to him, this inconsistency.

2.	Due Thursday, September 11, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	John Searle in "The Basic Structure of Intentionality, Action, and Meaning" writes "Intentional states ... have conditions of satisfaction and directions of fit." Explain this, being sure to explain what the terms mean. Give several examples.

3.	Due Thursday, September 18, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In "The Logical Structure of Reasons" Searle explains that a "total reason is a set of factive entities." Explain what this means. That will involve explaining what he means by "factive entities," and what he means by a "total reason." And it will involve giving examples. He also distinguishes (in that chapter) between what he calls "internal" and "external" reasons. Explain this (his) distinction. He says "The agent's deliberation can operate only on internal reasons, but the internal reasons are often valid reasons only because they represent external reasons." Explain what he means by that.

4.	Due Thursday, September 25, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In "Some Special Features of Practical Reason: Strong Altruism as a Logical Requirement" Searle argues that I am committed "to recognize that when you are in pain I have a reason to help you." Carefully lay out his argument for this claim, being sure to identify its premises. Where, if at all, does the argument go wrong?

5.	Due Thursday, October 2, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In "How we Create Desire-Independent Reasons for Action" Searle writes "That imposition of that sort of status function, of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction is already a commitment." Explain this. That will involve explaining "status function," "conditions of satisfaction," "imposition of ... conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction," "commitment," etc.

6.	Due Thursday, October 9, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In "Why There is No Deductive Logic of Practical Reason" Searle finds objections to three "Patterns of Practical Reason." Explain what each of these patterns is and why Searle objects to each one.

7.	Due Thursday, October 16, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	Michael Bratman in "The Intentions-Based-Reasons View" (2.5) puts up for consideration a revision to the desire-belief model of reasons, which he class "the intentions-based-reasons view." He then criticizes the view because it, he says, "leads us to sanction unacceptable forms of bootstrapping." Explain this intentions-based-reasons view. What does Bratman mean by "bootstrapping?" Explain the example involving Mondale's third question. So, what's this problem with bootstrapping?

8.	Due Thursday, October 23, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	Michael Bratman in "Plans and Practical Reasoning" offers a "log" example (pp. 39f). Explain the example. What thesis is the example supposed to support? Explain the thesis. Does the example support the thesis? Critically discuss.

9.	Due Thursday, October 30, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	Michael Bratman explores what he calls an "ahistorical" theory of rationality. In section 4.3.2 of Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason Bratman (with appeal to earlier material) puts up this ahistorical theory for consideration. See the last paragraph on page 59 for the overall structure of the ahistorical theory. Details of the principles are provided earlier in the chapter. State this theory and explain it with several examples of intentions that would be rational and (others that would be) irrational on this view. Don't use the Mondale example (or variations thereof).

10.	Due Thursday, November 6, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In section 6.1.2 of Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason Michael Bratman offers a "Historical principle of nondeliberative rationality for the basic case. Explain what he means by "the basic case" and give examples that are clearly fit and (others that) don't fit "the basic case." Explain his historical principle. Again, talk through it using examples, an example of case in which it is rational for someone to intend something, and an example of a case in whith it is not rational for an agent to intend to do a certain thing. Bratman considers two kinds of apparent "problems" for this analysis. In each case he responds to a queston "Is this plausible?" with "I think it is." Explain these two problems and Bratman's response.

11.	Due Thursday, November 13, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	On page 145 of Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason Michael Bratman writes "It is clear that once we accept this quartet of principles we are faced with the problem of the package deal." Explain this problem. Explain the four principles. Explain how accepting those principles, according to Bratman, results in that problem.

12.	Due Thursday, November 20, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In section 2.2 of Practical Reality Jonathan Dancy offers an argument against the DBR thesis. This is not the so-called "Simple Argument," but one, perhaps, based on "the advice point." Explain the DBR thesis and Dancy's (non-simple) argument against it.

13.	Due Thursday, December 4, 2003, 6:00 a.m.
	In chapter 3 of Practical Reality Jonathan Dancy "two main manoeuvers" that the "objectivist" might use to account for apparently "subjective" reasons. (See e.g. p.56, p.62.) Explain the objectivist view, what the objectivist is trying to account for in these apparently subjective reasons, and (in greater detail, using examples) the two main manoeuvers, especially the second one. This will require you to explain detachment. Critically discuss.