Introduction to Philosophy: Overhead

Taylor's Ingenious Physiologist Example
(IP3 376b)

Imagine a physiologist who causes me to have certain desires (and other internal psychological states).

If I then act from these desires, I am acting freely, according to the soft determinist.

But this is surely not a free action, Taylor says. ("It is the perfect description of a puppet." IP3 377a)

So, the Soft Determinist account of free action is mistaken.

The argument formulated:

1. If Soft Determinism is correct, then a person who acts from desires which have been induced in them (by an ingenious physiologist) is acting freely.
2. A person who acts from desires which have been induced in them (by an ingenious physiologist) is not acting freely.
3. Soft Determinism is not correct. (1, 2 MT)

Richard Lee, rlee@uark.edu, last modified: 10 October 2004

	1.	If Soft Determinism is correct, then a person who acts from desires which have been induced in them (by an ingenious physiologist) is acting freely.
	2.	A person who acts from desires which have been induced in them (by an ingenious physiologist) is not acting freely.
	3.	Soft Determinism is not correct. (1, 2 MT)