Berkeley's Heat-Pain Argument

1.Intense heat = pain.
2.For every x, if x cannot perceive, then x cannot have pain.
3.Material substances cannot perceive.
4.So,Material substances cannot have pain. (2,3)
5.So,Material substances cannot have intense heat. (4,1)
6.An external object is a material substance.
7.So,External objects cannot have intense heat. (5,6)

Premises in the text:

1. "But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain? / No one can deny it." (P 164a)

2. "And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure? / No, certainly." (P 164a)

3. "Is your material substance a senseless being or a being endowed with sense and perception? / It is senseless, without doubt." (P 164a)

4. "It [material substance] cannot, therefore, be the subject of pain? / By no means." (P 164a)

5. "Nor, consequently, [can material substances be the subject] of the greatest heat perceived by sense ..." (P 164a)

6. "What shall we say then of your external object: is it a material substance or no? / It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it." (P 164b)

C. "How then can a great heat exist in [an external object] ...?" (P 164b)


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Richard Lee, rlee@uark.edu, last modified: 21 February 2003