Question:
"Why is it . . . wrong to lie? And why is lying . . . worse, other things being equal, than other types of intended deception?"Answer:
"[I]f a person L asserts a proposition p to another person D, then D has the right to expect that L himself believes p. And . . . L knows, or at least . . . ought to know that, if he asserts p to D, while believing himself that p is not true, then he violates this right of D's. But analogous assumptions are not made with respect to other types of intended deception. . . . Lying, unlike the other types of intended deception, is essentially a breach of faith."The Argument:
L lies to D.
I.e., L asserts p to D but L does not believe p.
If L asserts p to D, then L gives D a right to L's believing p.
So, D has a right to L’s believing p.
L does not believe p.
So, L violates D’s right.
So, L has done wrong.
I.e., it is wrong to lie.
But it is not true that "If L tricks D into believing p, then L gives D a right to L's believing p."