"[I]n any kind of action in which there is a more and a less there is also what is equal. If, then, the unjust be unequal, the just is equal . . . The just . . . involves at least four terms; for the persons for whom it is in fact just are two, and the things in which it is manifested, the objects, are two. And the same equality will exist between the persons and the things concerned; for as the latter--the things concerned--are related, so are the former; for if they are not equal, they will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quarrels and complaints--when either equals have and are awarded unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. . . . [A]wards should be according to merit; for all men agree that what is just in distribution must be according to merit in some sense, though they do not all specify the same sort of merit, but democrats identify it with the status of freeman, supporters of oligarchy with wealth (or with noble birth), and supporters of aristocracy with excellence."

"The just, then, is a species of the proportionate . . . For proportion is equality of ratios and involves four terms at least . . . ; and the just, too, involves at least four terms, and the ratio is the same--for there is a similar distinction between the persons and between the things. As the term A, then, is to B, so will C be to D, and therefore, alternando, as A is to C, B will be to D. . . . [T]his coupling the distribution effects, and, if the terms are so combined, effects justly. . . . [T]he unjust is what violates this proportion . . ."