Notes (for The Realm of the Moral)

1 Some people claim to distinguish morality from ethics. Unfortunately there are many possible ways of making such a distinction. I think trying to draw a distinction here where there is no settled use to back it up is not helpful, so I will simply say that I understand "morality" (and "ethics") to encompass what some call "morality" as well as what some others call "ethics."

2 The genus of something is the more general category into which the thing falls. For example, the genus of automobiles and bicycles is vehicles.

3 This leaves aside the term "amoral." I think a person is called amoral when he or she takes no account of moral principles in his or her behavior. So considered, it is a psychological term. Presumably the behavior of an amoral person could still be considered immoral, even if we would suggest that all of the person's principles are non-moral principles.

4 Never mind for the time being whether you agree with these judgments. Nothing here depends upon them. They are to serve simply as examples. If you disagree with these judgments, you may furnish others for this purpose.

5 What the relation is between prudence and morality is a complicated and contentious issue which I cannot do justice to here.

6 Again, the relation between morality and religion is a controversial issue. Some people feel that all moral reasons rest ultimately on religious premises.

7 Once again, as in most philosophical matters, there is room for dispute. William Clifford wrote an article entitled "The Ethics of Belief" in which he claimed that "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." And in reading the article one gets the feeling that Clifford is claiming it to be morally wrong.

8 See Philippa Foot, "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives."

9 Nietzsche can be read in this way.

10 See "Kantian Ethical Theory."

11 I don't claim that it is always easy to know which bin an action falls into.

12 I put in lots of qualifications. I am not saying these are necessary. But I wish here to pick out an example of an action that nearly everyone would regard as morally wrong. Some people think it is morally permissible to kill innocent human beings if they are very young, or to kill people who wish to die, or to kill people who are not innocent, or to kill innocent adult animals who are not human beings.

13 As is the case so often in philosophy, this too is open to debate.

14 See J. O. Urmson, "Saints and Heroes." Today, however, some people call "heroes" people who have not acted in a heroic manner at all, but who have simply undergone some misfortune--hostages for instance -- or, worse, some pop icon.

15 There may be some other criteria that a supererogatory action may have to meet that have nothing to do with the moral spectrum. So, for example, perhaps an action would not count as saintly or heroic unless it were the kind of action that most people would not undertake (perhaps because of the danger or self-sacrifice involved).

16 Such a situation is called a "moral dilemma." If you are both morally required to do something and morally prohibited from doing it, you are in a moral dilemma. There is philosophical debate about whether genuine moral dilemmas are possible.

17 This is not to say that we should be judgmental and condemn others.


Richard Lee, rlee@comp.uark.edu, last modified: 17 May 2004